On Brendan Rodgers

Rodgers' appointment is imminent according to the BBC and Liverpool Echo, although we're still waiting for confirmation from the club.

Biography Snapshot
Born: 26 January 1973, Carnlough, Northern Ireland
Teams Managed: Swansea (July 2010 - May 2012), Reading (June 2009 - December 2009), Watford (November 2008 - June 2009)
Career Record: 151 matches (62W-33D-56L)

We might as well get the feared, loaded question out of the way up front. Is Brendan Rodgers the new flavor of the month?

There's no comparison – whether in tactics, personality, résumé, or otherwise – to the last time Liverpool hired a flavor of the month. But could Rodgers end up as this season's Owen Coyle?

No matter who FSG chose to replace Dalglish, it would have been a gamble. Martinez? Almost as inexperienced, although Rodgers has a "big club" background due to his time with Mourinho's Chelsea. Villas-Boas spectacularly failed in his last job, and was seemingly ruled out earlier in the process. The fans' choice, Rafa Benitez, was a non-starter; FSG had already been burned by reaching backwards, although Hodgson's inability to do anything right forced their hand in regards to Dalglish. They weren't going to make that mistake again, especially considering the baggage Benitez carries with a distinct segment of Liverpool fans and the British press, as well as his renowned demand for total control. Guardiola, Klopp? Not interested. Capello? Another who'd probably demand more control than FSG were willing to give and with little room for growth given his long CV.

It appears that the choice came down to Martinez or Rodgers. Two of the youngest managers in the league, one who's been in the league for just one season, the other who's never finished above 15th in his three top-tier seasons. FSG are obviously building with the long-term in mind.

Rodgers, unlike Martinez, has a preferred system. His sides play 4-3-3. Martinez's Wigan played every variation of 4-5-1 under the sun in addition to the much-written-about 3-4-3, with varying levels of success. Rodgers' Swansea side used the same formula in nearly every fixture this season: a moderately high defensive line focused on short passes and building from the back, three central midfielders, two fleet-footed wingers-cum-forwards, and a central striker.

Sure, call it 4-2-3-1 if you want – that often what Swansea looked like without the ball, Allen got forward from midfield more than Gower or Britton, and Dyer and Sinclair were as much wingers as wide forwards. Unlike other 4-2-3-1s, even when Allen got forward, he looked more a part of the central midfield than one of the attackers. This probably wouldn't be Rafa Benitez's 4-2-3-1, the style still used to define that formation in most Liverpool fans' minds.

More important than the formation are the ideas behind it. Rodgers, whose managerial lineage traces directly back to Jose Mourinho, is clearly a devotee of Barcelona and Spain's tiki-taka football – mentioned in almost anything written about Rodgers' Swansea and excellently summarized by the first half of this blog post. Two recent interviews are required reading: from the Telegraph in January and the Guardian prior to the May meeting with Liverpool, which are the sources of his subsequent quotes.

“I like to control games. I like to be responsible for our own destiny. If you are better than your opponent with the ball you have a 79 per cent chance of winning the game. For me it is quite logical. It doesn’t matter how big or small you are, if you don’t have the ball you can’t score.”

For fans reared by Benitez's Liverpool, this is a comforting quote. His Liverpool sides also dictated possession, albeit using different means. Swansea were often more ponderous in possession, but Swansea's players were almost totally Premiership novices. As Who Scored wrote soon after the news broke, only Barca (88.5%), Bayern (86.3%), and Manchester City (85.9%) had a better pass success rate in the top 5 leagues this season than Swansea's 85.7%.

It's self-serving to link my own earlier work, but the frustration over how Rodgers' Swansea stifled Liverpool in both meetings still oozes from the screen. And Liverpool weren't the only side to succumb to Swansea in such disheartening manner.

“My template for everything is organisation. With the ball you have to know the movement patterns, the rotation, the fluidity and positioning of the team. Then there’s our defensive organisation. So if it is not going well we have a default mechanism which makes us hard to beat and we can pass our way into the game again. Rest with the ball. Then we’ll build again."

And there's the Mourinho heritage. Organization, movement patterns, positioning. Not quite a rigid chessboard, but definable routines. I doubt it's coincidence that FSG refused Steve Clarke's resignation after Dalglish's sacking. Clarke worked with Rodgers under Mourinho, with Rodgers crediting Clarke for bringing him to Chelsea.

"I believe if you give a bad player time, he can play. If you give a good player time, he can kill you. So our emphasis is based around our positioning both with and without the ball. And for us, when we press well, we pass well."

Liverpool gave plenty of bad players time to kill them this season, whether by standing off in the final third or in refusing to press when the opposition reclaimed possession. Brendan Rodgers' sides rarely fail to do either.

"You work on zonal pressure, so that when it is in your zone, you have the capacity to press. That ability to press immediately, within five or six seconds to get the ball, is important. But you also have to understand when you can't and what the triggers are then to go for it again because you can't run about like a madman.

"It's decision-making and intelligence. And this was always the thing with the British player, they were always deemed never to be intelligent, not to have good decision-making skills but could fight like hell for the ball. I believe they have all of the [attributes] and, if you can structure that, then you can have real, effective results."

Liverpool also had a problem with a lack of intelligence from some of its British players, especially those acquired in the last 18 months, but the less said about that, the better. I suspect training, something that Rodgers takes full part in, will be an interesting place for the next few months. The Guardian interview, which is where that previous quote came from, is a priceless insight into how Rodgers sees and runs training sessions, and fits totally into the predominant belief that Liverpool are looking for a head coach rather than an all-consuming manager.

“When we have the football everybody’s a player. The difference with us is that when we have the ball we play with 11 men, other teams play with 10 and a goalkeeper.”

That should be music to Pepe Reina's ears. Reina's distribution (and overall form) suffered under both Hodgson and Dalglish, for various reasons. Liverpool's increasingly deep defense – whether Carragher started or not – almost assuredly hindered his talents. Returning to the 'sweeper-keeper' role he thrived in during Benitez's reign will hopefully see Reina's reclaim his place as one of the best goalkeepers in the league.

It's not incredibly difficult to see Rodgers' Swansea grafted onto Liverpool.



Short passes from the central defenders, building the attack from the back. Rodgers' Swansea never pressed as fervently as Barcelona, nor did the back four play as high a line – few, if any, do – but those are still predominant traits. Agger, Skrtel, Johnson, and Enrique should all do well in this system.

It'd be a fairly typical "runner, creator, destroyer" troika in central midfield, although the runner is usually the furthest-forward, with the two deeper central midfielders as deep-lying playmaker and holding tackler, although both midfielders need to have the ability to do both. Gerrard and Henderson can play as the most-advanced midfielder or both can play as the more-creative of the two deeper. Adam and Gower – Swansea's chance creation machine – could be similar in a deep-lying playmaker role, while Lucas is a vastly superior version of Leon Britton. As hinted at in the above formation diagram, after writing him off for the past two seasons, Aquilani could well find himself back in Liverpool's plans; a player who could star in Rodgers' system.

For Swansea, Sinclair cut inside from the left while Dyer or Routledge stretched play on the right. We could see a reversal of that with the disappointing Downing as an orthodox winger on the left and Suarez wreaking roaming havoc from the other side. The Uruguayan has played as a wide forward for both country and his previous club, and is capable of filling any forward role. Carroll is an archetypal English center-forward, better with the ball at his feet than he's given credit for, although he'd assuredly have to improve his movement and finishing to fit naturally into the system. But that's what training's for, right?

Yes, there are clear holes in Liverpool's version of this set-up, most notably in central midfield and up front. Which are obviously priority areas no matter the formation. There are clear holes in Liverpool's squad regardless of the set-up, as painfully proven during the duration of the previous campaign. I thought a 4-3-3/4-2-3-1 formation was the way forward last summer, and I still think similar now. But this is predominantly a conversation for another day. We've got all summer to fret about summer spending.

We still don't know the overall set-up of the club going forward. The Van Gaal (who was one of Mourinho's mentors) as Director of Football rumors seem to have slowly faded away, but whether that means Pep Segura and Rodolfo Borrell will split Technical Director duties with Ayre in charge of the purse-strings, whether Van Gaal's still in the frame, or whether Rodgers will have a closer-to-usual Premier League manager power over his domain remains to be seen. I suspect it'll be the former, but I won't pretend to have any inside insight either.

Regardless of the set-up, this appointment needs to be given time and backing. You can't overhaul the structure and appoint a young manager while expecting immediate results. Expectations were too high in each of the last three seasons, and Benitez, Hodgson, and Dalglish paid for it. Next season may well be painful. Maybe even as painful as the previous season was, although I both doubt it and certainly hope not. But unless we're forced to suffered through Hodgson-esque perpetual doom and gloom with absolutely no hope of improvement (or even an attempt at improvement), Rodgers will need license to fail before he can succeed.

Two weeks after Dalglish's exit, FSG seems to have gotten their man for their project. A young manager, more a head coach than club Godfather, who will develop alongside his increasingly younger squad. Even if we're unconvinced by or unhappy with the choice – which I'm not – this project needs to be given full patience for every chance at success.

Converting Defense Into Attack

That goal-scoring has been one of Liverpool's greatest problems is no great secret. But Liverpool's first two goals last night – more specifically, how Liverpool scored those goals with quick transitions from defense to attack – shows the promise in this side. If Liverpool play a certain way.

The first was an archetypal break from defense.



Enrique's interception and pass, a one-touch layoff from Suarez, Downing's run into the opposition half before returning the ball to Suarez as central pivot, another one-touch move – a give and go with Henderson, which led to a throughball for Kelly, fortunately directed into his path by Gerrard. From Enrique's interception to Kelly's shot, Liverpool's procession from one penalty box to the other took all of 15 seconds.

This was Suarez at his most influential; he didn't have to singlehandedly conjure brilliance, but was the hub for the entire move, completing pass-and-move triangles with both Downing and Henderson before releasing Kelly. It would have been more aesthetically pleasing had the right-back finished the move – Brazil's hallmark goal in the 1970 World Cup made all the better because Carlos Alberto tallied it – but Liverpool scored despite Howard's save because Liverpool got midfielders into Everton's penalty box.



When Kelly takes his shot, Liverpool have five attackers in the penalty area – Kelly, Carroll, Henderson, Suarez, and Gerrard – matching Everton's five defenders. Five evenly-spaced attackers, all consciously trying to find space away from markers. No matter where Kelly's rebound fell, a Liverpool player had an excellent chance of following up. Which Gerrard did, sublimely.

For Liverpool's second, Kelly tackled Pienaar just inside Liverpool's half. 12 seconds later, after two passes and one mazy run, Gerrard slammed the ball into the back of the net.



Moments like this are why Henderson seems so promising. He immediately turns, gets his head up, and charges forward, instinctively starting the break as quickly as possible. Suarez takes off, splitting the retreating center-backs, both on the back foot not expecting Everton to cheaply concede possession. Gerrard's also beginning his burst forward, as is Downing on the far left.



And this is where Suarez makes goals by being Suarez. He'd ignored Henderson's run into the box, seemingly selfishly, preferring to take Distin on at the byline with a typical mazy dribble. But because he's Suarez, he beats Distin, then Jagielka for good measure.



Right here is where Suarez has had to take the shot in numerous other games, a shot which is probably saved by Howard or cleared off the line by Rodwell. But because Gerrard kills himself to get into the box once again, not picked up by Baines covering in the middle, Suarez has someone to pass to. Someone who isn't Downing, with two defenders between him and Suarez, or Carroll, who planted himself at the top of the box for an unlikely cutback.

It's not Route 1 football – which we saw at times yesterday, most notably when Reina's goal kick to Carroll was flicked on for Suarez, his shot saved by Howard – but it's direct football, whether with a quick counter-attack from Liverpool's own half or because Liverpool won the ball by challenging the opposition in their half. Move the ball at pace, before the defense settles, and move with pace without the ball. Those two goals were similar to some of the best that Liverpool have scored this season: Suarez's equalizer against Stoke in the Carling Cup and both goals in the 2-1 league win at Chelsea, among others. Too few others.

This team has been most potent when in free flow. Whether we've not seen it enough because of Liverpool personnel or tactics, or because most opponents don't allow it, is a valid question, one I'm not wholly equipped to answer. Having both Gerrard and Suarez at their best, combined with another attacker in Carroll and with Henderson and Downing both having bright moments, certainly helped. Gerrard, Suarez, and Carroll have started three matches, and Liverpool have won all three, scoring 11 against Brighton, Cardiff, and Everton. Even though he didn't score, pushing his lone chance wide of the post early in the second half, Carroll demonstrated that he's not a fish out of water in a quick passing, quick movement style of play.

As written in yesterday's match review, Liverpool need to take these tactical successes into account in the future. Quick, cohesive transitions have seen the team at its most promising during this transitional season. It's lead to an attack few can cope with when on top form, but that top form hasn't been displayed anywhere near enough.

Three Midfielders, Two Halves

It's been awhile since I trawled through the Guardian chalkboards for interesting items. I know, we all missed it.

I remain convinced that Liverpool changed tact in midfield during the interval. The key seemed to be Spearing, more willing to stay in his own half and shield the defense rather than pressing higher up the pitch and leaving gaps. But the passing chalkboards suggest that all three central midfielders played differently in the first and second halves.





Both Spearing and Adam sat deeper, more content to hold their positions. Henderson was also less involved going forward, attempting fewer crosses (none of which he completed through 90 minutes), more concentrated on the right flank with Kuyt much more a striker. Spearing attempted the same number of passes, Adam and Henderson both attempted fewer. Spearing and Henderson had an improved completion rate, while Adam sacrificed a slight drop in accuracy but provided two much-needed assists.

The passing heatmaps make these trends more noticeable.



Out-and-out attack is all well and good, and often needed for this Liverpool side to score again less-fancied opposition, but the base in midfield is crucial for starting these attacks while still securing the defense. When Spearing and Adam go forward, gaps appear if either, or anyone else, loses possession, especially with both Johnson and Enrique bombing forward, which they did yesterday and often do against less-fancied opposition. And this led to a couple of Wolves' first-half chances, which, thankfully, Wolves couldn't take. Comparatively, the home side had just one second-half chance, Ebanks-Blake's rocket from nowhere, despite needing goals and shifting to 4-4-2 after Liverpool's second.

Liverpool may have had more possession in the first half (55-45% at half-time, 53-47% at full-time), but that's as much down to Liverpool being able to sit and counter after finally getting on the score sheet. Counter-attacking which led to the second and third goals. And a focus on counter-attacking also allowed Spearing and Adam to focus more on defending. But, of course, Liverpool needed to score first for that change in tactic to be successful. Round and round in circles we go.

Admittedly, Spearing's second-half improvement can also be credited to simply playing. He's missed far too much time over the winter months, first due to an unfair suspension, then following an injury in the first leg of the Carling Cup semi. It wouldn't be surprising if he needed time to find his sea legs. Hopefully, now back to fitness, he'll continue this improvement, especially with Gerrard back in the side.

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Finally, a bonus chalkboard. It has little to do with the point made above, but is just as crucial to Liverpool's style of play and results.



In the first half, Liverpool attempted 17 crosses, completing five. In the second half, Liverpool attempted six crosses, completing two, one the assist for the opener.

Kuyt was 3 for 8 on crosses, Henderson was 0 for 7, Adam was 2 for 3, Bellamy was 1 for 3, and Enrique was 1 for 2. 13 of the 23 total crosses came in the first 20 minutes – an average of one every 90 seconds or so – when Liverpool were clearly on top but, again, couldn't take advantage of dominance.

I've grumbled about Liverpool's crossing before, and had Liverpool kept up its first-half crossing pace, yesterday's match would have rivaled 3-1 at Newcastle and 0-3 at City for most crosses in a league match. Punting the ball toward Carroll is an obvious tactic, something the striker thrives on. But it's not the only thing he thrives on, and usually better for the team as a whole when used as an alternative – a Plan A only if there's a viable Plan B, not the lone source of attack. The second half, where Liverpool attempted fewer and one finally led to an assist, bears that out.

What's The Formation, Kenneth? (Again)

I've seen some hand-wringing and questions as to how Liverpool were lined up yesterday, especially in the second half.



I tried to explain the set-up and the reasons for it in yesterday's match review, but pictures always make things easier. Not a 1000 words easier, but easier nonetheless.

Liverpool's first substitution obviously wasn't planned, and Spearing's exit restrained the away side more than they would have liked in the first 45 minutes when on top. But there was a clear strategy with the next two substitutions. The second half followed a simple narrative. Mancini made a change, Dalglish would respond. Mancini made another change, Dalglish parried a different way.

Adam Johnson was key to both sides' tactics, City's most dangerous play-maker with Silva absent, even after Nasri came on. Glen Johnson began on the left in response, an inverted full-back used to mute an inverted winger, evoking fond memories of Arbeloa on Messi four years earlier. When the Manchester City winger stopped playing down that flank early in the second half, shifting into the hole with Milner on the right and Nasri on the left, Enrique came on. Glen Johnson went central, as a left-sided center-back, partly to still keep an eye on Adam Johnson and partly to continue doubling up on Micah Richards' dangerous overlaps. When Dzeko and Kolarov entered, Johnson went to right back, tasking with keeping Nasri and Kolarov from getting crosses in for the target-man, while Carragher came on as defensive midfielder. Or, to go all in on the nomenclature game, as a libero: Carra Baresi, just as he's always fancied himself. Really, he came on to add another body in defense, because Liverpool certainly weren't looking to add anything to attack. Just to seal any possible cracks in the armor.

The most debate will probably be about the "second sub" formation: was Johnson a third center-back or a defensive midfielder? This sort of detail borders on semantics, splitting the finest of hairs, but I'll argue he was a center-back. Johnson stepped forward the few times Liverpool were in possession, but as soon as City entered the final third, Johnson was on the same line as Skrtel and Agger, defending like a center-back, making tackles in the penalty area, most notably on Agüero in the 68th. If Liverpool had more possession and Johnson was able to spend more time stepping forward, there's more an argument for calling him a midfielder. But Liverpool were almost always on the back foot. Yes, partly by design. And partly because Manchester City is still Manchester City.

Was it risky? Sure. Any time you invite pressure, you invite risks. Liverpool's defensive 1-0 win at Stamford Bridge last season was risky too, but Liverpool's five-man defense held on for the win after getting the goal. Any time you play a team as strong as Manchester City, especially on their ground, you have to take risks, no matter the key players they (and Liverpool) had absent.

Was it overly defensive? Nope. Because Liverpool won. There was no guarantee of a second Liverpool goal had the away side kept up the pressure seen the first 15 minutes. But there certainly would have been a greater danger of conceding an equalizer. City's two goals against United on Sunday, despite being down to ten, clearly loomed large in Dalglish and Clarke's minds, a reminder of what the league leaders are capable of when you give them space to operate, even at a man disadvantage. Preventing that from happening, keeping Liverpool's narrow edge for the second leg, was the only goal. And understandably so.

Goal Breakdown: Suicidal Defending and Taking Advantage

Both of Liverpool's goals against Chelsea were fantastic, strikes which have an excellent chance of showing up on various best-of-season lists. The first showed the benefits of pressing from the front and quick pass and move football, the second direct football at its finest: a cross-field diagonal opening up acres of space for an attacking full-back bombing forward.

But make no mistake. Despite each goal's outstanding qualities, both came because of some suicidal decision-making from Chelsea's defense.



Cech's decision to send the goal kick to Mikel (an illegally-taken goal kick, having touched it twice, I might add...) baffles in the extreme. Four Liverpool players are closer to Mikel than any in blue. Both Terry and Luiz have gone wide, each to the left and right of the penalty box, which has to be by design. Mikel's lone option in that position is to empty it as far as humanly possible, and when he dawdles in making that decision, Adam's on him in a flash.

With Mikel out of the picture after Adam's tackle, it left Chelsea with two defending four, and Bellamy, Suarez, and Maxi's quick passing and movement rendered them irrelevant. Terry was beaten by Suarez's touch back to Bellamy, Luiz by Bellamy's extra pass to Maxi, leaving the Argentinean open to smartly finish past Cech.

The second, in the final minutes of the game, was little better from the home side's point of view.



With the ball held up on the left flank – Enrique, Downing, and Suarez successfully keeping possession after bringing the ball out from defense – Adam's pinpoint cross-field caught multiple players out of position.

Chelsea have eight defenders in their own half. Eight. Pity they're all bunched up on the wrong side of the pitch after Adam's diagonal. Terry and Luiz's positioning (circled) is exceptionally unforgivable: both far forward, both basically atop each other. Why Terry, ostensibly the left-sided center-back, is in that position is almost completely unexplainable.

Malouda and Cole are the only two defenders on the left side of the pitch in Chelsea's half, and both are closer to the center circle than the touchline. When Malouda can't get back, a retreating Ashley Cole's left one-on-one with a rampaging Johnson, who still has work to do to beat the Chelsea full-back, which he does brilliantly by shifting onto his left foot, nutmegging Cole in the process. Kuyt's run into the box keeps both Luiz and Terry occupied, leaving England's Brave Captain unable to clear off the line after he decides to stick closer to the already-marked Kuyt instead of bailing out Cole and Malouda.

Liverpool needed smart, sublime plays from its attackers in both cases: excellent pressing from a central midfielder and divine interplay between three of the front four in the first case; Adam's pass and Johnson's run in the second. And Dalglish's tactical chess – first half pressing, second half counter-attack – provided the platform for Liverpool to get both goals. But both were infinitely aided by Chelsea's defensive decisions: a strange clear-out leaving Mikel isolated on the first; positional indiscipline (especially in drifting toward the ball) as well as Luiz and Terry's indecision on the second.

The media's quick to draw knifes, as we've seen unfairly happen to Dalglish following Liverpool's multiple disappointing draws. But after conceding in this fashion, it's little wonder that those knifes are out for Villas-Boas this morning.

Trying to Find a Balance

"Balance" has been a word tossed around frequently as Liverpool tries to fine-tune its recently-acquired shape. Balance between attack and defense, balance between controlling the game and pushing the tempo, balance between direct football and pass and move football.

On Saturday, Glen Johnson started at right back for only the second time this season, for the first time with summer signing Jordan Henderson ahead of him on the right.

Liverpool have deployed a somewhat lopsided formation every time Henderson's started on the right, deeper than his counterpart on the opposite flank. Saturday's difference was that with Johnson, Liverpool were able to balance Henderson's proclivity to cut inside with an attack-focused fullback willing to stay wide and overlap.



Downing and Enrique, who have had a few more games to build an understanding, form a more orthodox pairing. Downing, a true winger, spends far more time in the opposition half, further forward, than Henderson. Enrique, therefore, spends more time coming inside, especially when in Liverpool's half, whether starting the attack or doubling up on an attacker with Downing less likely to track back than Henderson.



What's still best described as a 4-2-2-2 – two strikers, two central midfielders, and two "wide" players – easily becomes a lopsided 4-3-3 with how Henderson and Downing play their roles.



It's interesting to see Downing's average position so far forward, while Henderson's as much a part of a midfield three as a right-midfielder, especially given Adam's ability to pull wide to the left for deep crosses and diagonals. And at the same time, Lucas's holding position seems deeper than usual, almost like Busquets in front of Barcelona's center-backs, protecting the back line and ready to pull wide to cover where needed.

Simply by looking at the average position diagram, you could classify the formation as 2-3-2-3: Skrtel and Agger deepest, the full-backs and Lucas, Henderson and Adam linking defense and attack, and Downing, Carroll, Suarez up front. It's almost replicating the historic W-W formation from the 1930s. Which, incidentally, Jonathan Wilson wrote about in regards to Barcelona almost exactly a year ago. Not to compare an evolutionary, maturing Liverpool to Barca or team which won consecutive World Cups or anything.

With West Brom supremely lacking in ambition and with Thomas and Brunt on the wings – neither the trickiest opponent – both Johnson and Enrique were relatively untroubled in defense. The fullbacks attempted four tackles combined, three successful, through 90 minutes.

Against routine opposition, we got to see the Liverpool of the future, what Dalglish is seemingly building towards: a fluid, adaptable formation. If direct football, with long passes, runs at defenders and deep crosses, isn't working down the left, Johnson and Henderson make it possible for slower buildup with overlaps from the full-back on the right. Admittedly, most opponents will put up more of a struggle, will make Liverpool work far harder in both halves, and will put both Henderson and Downing under far more pressure, requiring each to contribute more in defense.

But against mid-table opposition and lower, both home and away, this is seemingly the template to be followed. Saturday's match against West Brom, with Johnson back and with Henderson having his best game so far for Liverpool, was the first conclusive demonstration that it could actually work.

What's the Formation, Kenneth?

Yesterday, I remarked that Liverpool apparently used the third different formation in three matches despite starting the same front six in all three. What do the Daily Telegraph's average position charts (click on "team stats" on the right sidebar) have to say?



It's difficult to divine the 4-4-2 diamond from the average position diagram against Birmingham. Kuyt and Meireles occupy almost the same location, despite the fact Kuyt seemingly played as a striker, dropping deep receive the ball, while Meireles linked midfield and attack. Spearing is ahead of and to the right of Lucas, while similar goes for Maxi on the left, who's slightly narrower than in the other two matches.

The image below shows the run-up to Liverpool's second. Meireles is tucked in behind the strikers, with Spearing and Maxi on either side and Kuyt and Suarez ahead, ready for the flick-on. Lucas, at the base of the diamond, is out of the picture, protecting the defense only slightly ahead of Carragher and Skrtel.



Against Newcastle, the average position diagram clearly shows more of a 4-2-2-2 formation. Spearing and Lucas are on the same line, Meireles is deeper and wider, and Kuyt is closer to Suarez. As Johnson and Flanagan switched flanks at halftime, neither appears in their "normal" position; Flanagan is next to Lucas while Johnson's circle is hidden by Spearing.

The quick counter-attack for Liverpool's first, bursting from defense, demonstrates this formation. Kuyt and Suarez, each trying to find space, are ahead of the midfield line of four. As the attack progresses, Meireles and Maxi continue ahead of the "holding midfielders"; Maxi eventually takes up a position in space at the back post, in the right place for Williamson's poor clearance.



At Fulham, Liverpool's average position looks similar to that against Birmingham. But it clearly wasn't a 4-4-2 diamond when watching the match. If compelled to make a notation just from the diagram, it looks almost as much a lopsided 4-3-2-1 as 4-2-3-1. Or you could call it 4-5-1. Or 4-3-3. I obviously think I'm right, and it's worth differentiating from the other two matches, but herein lies the flaws of forcing football onto paper.

To again use a singular moment to demonstrate a 90-minute-long match, below shows Liverpool right before the opener, with a deeper Lucas and Spearing poised to launch a quick attack. Suarez is already out of the picture, bursting down the left channel to beat the offside trap, but Maxi, Meireles, and Kuyt form a clear line of three along the halfway line.



Of course, if I looked hard enough, we could probably show different formations from different sequences. Formational notation foibles aside, this flexibility has served Liverpool incredibly well of late. Birmingham, Newcastle, and Fulham may not have been the most daunting of opponents, but two of those three have been painful thorns in Liverpool's side in recent years, while Liverpool failed to beat both Newcastle and Birmingham under Hodgson (spectacularly failed, in the case of Newcastle).

Opposition teams have no clue who's going to pop up in the penalty area, and are infinitely scared of Suarez wherever he may be, permanently on the back foot because of his ability with the ball. Different midfielders have gone through spells of blazing-hot form: first Meireles, scoring five in six during January and February, then Maxi, with seven goals in his last three games. Kuyt's scoring like it's going out of style, tallying nine starting with his hat-trick against the Mancs and notching in each of the last five games. Johnson's return has added much-needed width to the side, creating two assists yesterday.

It'll be interesting to see if Liverpool remains this flexible come next season. Gerrard and Carroll, among others, will return to the starting XI, while Liverpool will be in the market for a left-sided winger/forward at the very least. However, for once, it's nice to live in the moment. I still can't believe I'll be sad to see this season end.

Jay Spearing is Not a Defensive Midfielder

Up until the last four games, Jay Spearing's rarely looked liked having a long-term future at Liverpool. Admittedly, he also hadn't gotten a consistent run in the side until Gerrard's season-ending injury, only once playing more than two consecutive games: earlier this season against Steaua and Northampton. He didn't stand out in cameos against Real Madrid and PSV in 2008-09, three starts in 2009-10 (the two league cup matches and at Sunderland), or seven appearances under Hodgson. Happily, with Liverpool's hand forced by injuries, he's shown remarkable improvement since the 2-0 win at Sunderland.

Since Xabi Alonso left, fans have alternated between cries of "Gerrard's not an orthodox central midfielder" and "Lucas and X are too defensive." And there's truth in both statements. Lucas/Mascherano was too defensive at times. Lucas/Poulsen was definitely too defensive, with the added bonus of Poulsen being so far over the hill he's on flat ground. Two managers have been mostly unwilling to play Meireles in a central midfield pairing with Lucas, aside from a two-week stretch against Spurs, Villa, and Newcastle. But the Lucas/Spearing partnership hasn't as defensive as initially feared.

Spearing's passing chalkboards and heat maps from the last four games illustrate his development and abilities well.

Passing Chalkboards:


Heat Maps:

Click on the images. Trying a new plug-in; they should open full-size in a Javascript box. Let me know if there are any problems with this. My CSS knowledge is both dangerous and limited.

Unsurprisingly, the home match against City was his most-attacking performance of the four, if not the all-around best. It also happened to be Liverpool's largest win. He completed 18 more passes than against West Brom – his second-highest total of the four – and was more active according to the heat map. Liverpool bossed that game; it's no surprise to see Spearing's so influential.

But we can also see progression from Sunderland to West Brom to City to Arsenal. Despite his won penalty – another example of how he can get forward – the away match against Sunderland was his most "defensive" performance, evidenced by the heat map which shows his focus on the center circle area. Out-numbered in midfield against West Brom, in what was easily Liverpool's worst performance of the four, Spearing still attempted to prod Albion's defense down the left, shown in the passing chalkboard.

But the heat map and chalkboard from City and Arsenal show a player who's looking to link midfield and attack, highly-mobile and almost always on the run. Against both clubs, despite Liverpool's different strategies in the two matches, Spearing's heat maps show as much time spent in the opposition half as Liverpool's own – even against Arsenal, where Liverpool were frequently pegged back, but Spearing could have won another first-half spot kick.

I've been fighting the "Lucas is too defensive" stereotype since 2007. But Lucas is the defensive midfielder these days, and that's the area of his game which has most improved. He does rarely get forward, although still doesn't get enough credit for when he does – scoring against Benfica last year and Steaua this year, among others. No matter how he was billed when joining the club, the fact is that Lucas has become unarguably better when deployed deeper.

However, Spearing is more of a link player, and has become important to Liverpool's attack over the last month. Bustling, busy, and full of running, but still willing to get forward. These traits make him an ideal partner for Lucas.

The pairing still limits Liverpool in certain regards. Spearing doesn't have huge range of passing – Liverpool's weakness in this area explains Dalglish's January pursuit of Charlie Adam – while neither he nor Lucas score with any semblance of regularity. But intelligence and endeavor go a long way. And Spearing's dramatic improvement since earning his starting place bodes well.

Possession isn't nine-tenths of the law anymore

Yesterday, Liverpool managed to earn a draw despite dramatically losing the possession battle. Arsenal had 62% of the ball, the most any opposition have had since Dalglish took the reins. Liverpool were under pressure and pegged back for long stretches of the match, but only conceded thanks to a sloppy penalty eight minutes into injury time.

Normally, you'd think that a bad thing. Even after the season we've seen, most of us are still used to the Rafa Benitez method deployed over six seasons: keep possession first and foremost. Blunt the opposition, set the tempo, play keep-away. Spain and Barcelona have won everything under the sun in recent years with similar (if far more effective) tactics, so it must be the "right method." But that hasn't been the case for Liverpool this season. And more often than not, losing the possession battle has actually been a good thing.

Simply put, whether under Hodgson or Dalglish, Liverpool have been better in matches where the opposition has more of the ball.

In the league, Liverpool have eight wins, four draws, and nine losses – an average of 1.33 points per game – when they out-possess their opponents. When the opposition has more possession, Liverpool have won six, drawn three, and lost three – an average of 1.75 points per game, and a difference of almost a half-point per game.

Liverpool have been held under 45% possession in six matches this season: v Arsenal, v Chelsea, at Wolves, at Chelsea, v United, and at Arsenal. Twice under Hodgson, four times under Dalglish. And Liverpool are unbeaten in all six, winning four while drawing twice against the Gunners.

The disparity grows when just considering Dalglish's 13 games: 3W-2D-2L with more possession than the opposition, 4W-1D-1L when the opposition out-possesses Liverpool. An average of 1.57 points per game versus 2.17 points per game. The games won with more possession have been against City, Stoke, and Fulham (all at Anfield); the games won with less possession were against Sunderland, United, Chelsea, and Wolves (all but United away from home). Getting results on the road has happened with defense and counter-attacking football. Finally.

It's been a trend all season, but the January changes were the turning point. Dalglish and Clarke have done a far better job organizing the team, especially the defense. Exchanging Torres for Suarez and Carroll improved Liverpool's ability to counter-attack, with both better at bringing in midfield runners such as Kuyt and Meireles. Liverpool are scoring more goals – having notched in every one of Dalglish's league matches – and conceding less.

But they're doing it with some similarities to Hodgson's team. As said above, players have changed, as have certain tactics (pressing higher up the pitch being the most noticeable). But Liverpool's still reliant on the counter-attack, back in a 4-4-2/4-2-2-2 formation since injuries to Gerrard and multiple defenders, and still getting better results when conceding more possession to the opposition.

Clearly, it's not so simple as just having less possession or the likes of Stoke, Bolton, and Blackburn (or whoever Hodgson's managing) would win the league every season. But it's strange to see such a variation in results contingent upon how much of the ball Liverpool has.

At the end of August, I lamented Liverpool's lack of possession, unhappy with early performances and results under the new manager and still expecting Benitez's metronomic tactics.

Sometimes, a tiger can change its stripes. But it needs the right manager to do so.

It's Still The Defense, Stupid

Above is the chalkboard which stood out the most. Seven interceptions in a 90 minute span. None in the center of Liverpool's half. Two from Lucas, one from Cole, Gerrard, Johnson, Kuyt, and Skrtel.

For comparison, in the last three league matches, Liverpool had 19 against Wigan, 26 against Chelsea, and 10 against Stoke (where Liverpool were rarely under threat). In the last loss under Dalglish, his first league match at Blackpool, Liverpool had 17.

West Ham had a smart strategy yesterday, whether Liverpool used three at the back (in the first half) or four (after Kelly's injury). Keep the ball out of the middle and attack the flanks. Central midfielders Hitzlsperger and Noble both looked to spread the play wide, as did Parker in more of a holding role. All three of their goals came from crosses or runs down one of the channels. That pattern of play is also evident in the tackles chalkboard.



The majority of Liverpool's tackles, either attempted or successful, were on the left. It's no coincidence that two of the Hammers' goals came from that side. First, West Ham worked the ball down that flank before Hitzlsperger and Parker played a one-two for the opener, leaving Suarez, Meireles, and Lucas chasing shadows. The crucial second, right before half-time, saw Ba beat Wilson to a hopeful punt, Carragher slow to close down the crosser, and Johnson and Skrtel flat-footed in the box. Both goals were comprehensive failures. The third, sealing the game, was an embarrassment shared by Skrtel and Reina, singularly beaten all ends up by Carlton freaking Cole. Again, the goal started on the flank, this time Liverpool's right, cutting in after Skrtel was easily shaken off before beating Reina at his near post.

Liverpool seemed to have put defensive frailties in the past over the last seven games, conceding just once (dubiously, I might add). Deploying three at the back against Stoke and Chelsea wholly blunted those sides. And it's not as if both Stoke and Chelsea played the similarly while West Ham found a novel way to exploit the tactic. Chelsea's narrowness suited a packed defense, but Stoke relies on long balls and crosses through the likes of Pennant, Etherington, and Walters (as well as set plays, obviously). Liverpool played three at the back for approximately 40 minutes because of Kelly injury, only conceding one of the three during that spell, and no one system is a comprehensive solution, but yesterday's failings unfortunately lead me to blame the personnel more than the tactics (in addition to crediting the opposition).

Yesterday, injuries finally caught up with the side. Agger – whose importance can't be overstated, despite his fragility – was ruled out before the match, as was Aurelio. The imperious Kelly pulled up right before West Ham's second goal. It left Liverpool reliant on a 19-year-old center-back at left back and the increasingly shaky Skrtel-Carra pairing in the middle. It's no coincidence that when exploring who played when Liverpool conceded last week, Agger and Kelly had the best goals against average. Incidentally, Liverpool also started a different backline for the 23rd time in 41 games. Not having a settled defense continues to haunt the club.

Lack of depth has been punishing the team all season long. Yesterday is just yet another example of that. Writing that Liverpool need to upgrade at both center-back and left back is stating the obvious in the extreme.

This defeat simply proves that Liverpool still has a long road to travel, no matter the positives from the previous seven or eight matches. Those positives can't be forgotten, and as I wrote in yesterday's match review, how Liverpool reacts to this setback will define the final 10 games of the campaign.

Chelsea Chalkboard Review

As most are aware, I frequently trawl through Liverpool's chalkboards after games looking for inspiration. Stats never tell a full story, but often help color in between the narrative's lines. Today I thought I'd show how Liverpool controlled yesterday's game by using Chelsea's chalkboards.

Average Position:
Liverpool (3-1-5-1):

Sunderland (4-5-1):


Having three at the back was obviously the main difference, man-marking both Chelsea strikers with an additional CB to pick up the pieces, but Lucas' role also blunted Chelsea's effectiveness. The deep-lying midfielder was able to control Chelsea's attacking pivot – Anelka. Sunderland's unbalanced 4-5-1 saw Sessesgnon – ostensibly the left winger – more often inside, creating a midfield diamond with Malbranque, Richardson, and Henderson while Elmohamady provided width on the right. But none of those four midfielders had a strictly defensive brief; all four prefer to get forward to join the attack. Without an out-and-out holding player, Anelka had the freedom of the pitch.

Anelka:


Man of the match mid-week with a goal and assist, Anelka attempted 16 more passes against Sunderland, completing 12 more, and was busier in all areas of the opposition half. Against Liverpool, he was restricted to a smaller section of the pitch, far more central, where Lucas could stay in front of him.

Lampard and Essien:



Meanwhile, Chelsea's other "attacking" midfielders – Lampard and Essien, the sides of the diamond – were also far less potent. There is a distinct pattern to their play against Sunderland: Lampard stayed primarily on the left, Essien on the right. Both players had a higher pass completion rate against Liverpool, but both perpetually roamed instead of staying in defined roles, trying to force a break-through, unable to come to terms with Liverpool's stymieing formation. In addition, far more passes from both are either sideways or backwards against Liverpool compared to against Sunderland.

Torres v Kalou:


Yikes. Bad day at the office. To be fair, it was Torres' debut. But still. Yikes. It goes without saying that a striker needs to be more diligent when the team's struggling. But Torres doesn't go looking for chances; he needs to be presented with them. And Chelsea's creators couldn't do so. Which is why Chelsea's record signing was hauled off with the score level and a third of the game left to play.

Shots:


All together, it led to a far reduced attacking output, which was clearly Liverpool's intent. Chelsea took eight less shots on Sunday. Half of those shots came from outside the box. None of the shots from distance found the target. Only one – when Anelka put Malouda through in the 73rd minute – forced a save from Reina, and with Malouda pushed to a narrow angle, it wasn't a difficult save. When Liverpool went ahead by a goal, the wing-backs quickly converted to more orthodox full-backs, shutting down another area of the pitch and congesting the final third, limiting Chelsea chances even further. Against Sunderland, Chelsea created shots from all angles, with four goals from nine attempts on target.


After Wednesday's match against Stoke, most assumed Liverpool's 3-4-2-1 was a one-off tactic. Now we're wondering if that match was a preview for stopping Chelsea or hearkened a tactical revolution devised to reinvigorate a shaky defense. It worked as planned in both matches, but I'm still skeptical that it's a long-term solution, especially when Suarez and Carroll come into the fold.

We'll find out a lot more on Saturday, when Liverpool host struggling Wigan. At home against a side that almost always plays 4-5-1 – without the aerial threat Stoke provides – Liverpool seem likely to focus on attack rather than defense.

Stoke Chalkboard Review: A Tale of Four Partnerships

Liverpool's tactical chess against Stoke, well-analyzed by Noel from Liverpool Offside, worked a treat yesterday. Best described as a 3-4-2-1, it was interesting to see the roles played by each in the new formation.

What caught my eye in the chalkboards was how roles overlapped and fit together, increasing the side's overall cohesion. Both Agger and Skrtel played as supplementary center-backs, bordering on orthodox fullbacks. Kelly and Johnson were up and down the pitch as wingbacks. Lucas and Aurelio formed the base of the central midfield square, while Gerrard and Meireles each fluidly roamed in a free role.






Most notable was how Agger and Skrtel supplemented the attack with Stoke pinned back. Both chalkboards look more like orthodox, deep lying fullbacks rather than center-backs. With Kyrgiakos man-marking Carew into invisibility, Agger and Skrtel both had license to get forward. That's a major part of Agger's game, but one hilarious moment saw Skrtel charging towards goal a la Mark Lawrenson, beating defenders before striking a pitiful shot wide.

But Liverpool prospered in each section. Gerrard was everywhere in a familiar free role. Lucas steadily ran the show, with an 89% completion rate against pressing, physical Stoke. Liverpool could have done with more end product from both wingbacks – Kelly looked more comfortable on his preferred side, only to have crosses routinely fail to find heads – but each worked diligently to give Liverpool real width.

The greatest compliment I can bestow is that Liverpool looked wholly comfortable in this unfamiliar system. Benitez infrequently threw tactical curve balls, such as the 3-4-3 in an 0-1 loss to Sunderland and the 3-4-2-1 which beat Portsmouth 3-2 in 2009. But in those matches, whether win or loss, it took time for Liverpool to come to grip with the changes. Yesterday, the team looked like they'd be doing this all season, taking 30 minutes to adapt and duly threaten Stoke. That's a credit to Dalglish and assistant manager Steve Clarke. As is the fact that Liverpool have kept three successive clean sheets for the first time all season.

A couple more notes of interest:

• While it doesn't fit with the overall theme of "partnerships," Reina's passing rate needs to be highlighted

35 of 39 – 90% – is an incredibly high completion rate for a goalkeeper. And it's not as if all were short passes out to a defender. Out of 11 attempts over the halfway line, Reina completed seven, which is a credit to Kuyt's play as the lone striker. Against Fulham, he completed 16 out of 24. Against Wolves, 14 out of 35. Just a wonderful display from a keeper who's already superlative when distributing the ball. And to think we were worried when his passing rate plummeted under Hodgson and Mike Kelly.

• Following the Wolves match, I wrote about the decreasing number of passes since Dalglish took the reins. Last night put paid to that notion. Liverpool attempted 578 passes, completing 449 – a 78% rate. Compare that to 379 attempted at Wolves, 434 attempted against Everton, and 517 against Blackpool. The number of passes rose against Fulham – to a similar 459 completed out of 574 – but Liverpool were far more effective yesterday, evident in both the style of play and score line.

• Glen Johnson attempted the fewest passes of any Liverpool starter with 36. Only one Stoke player – fullback Andy Wilkinson, with 43 – attempted more than Johnson. The midfielder with the most completed passes was Pennant, with 22, the same number of passes Liverpool's deepest center-back completed. It's not hyperbolic to suggest Liverpool passed Stoke into submission.

Welcome back, Liverpool.